Abstract-Reviews spams are prevalent in e-commerce to manipulate product ranking and customers decisions maliciously. While spams generated based on simple spamming strategy can be detected effectively, hardened spammers can evade regular detectors via more advanced spamming strategies. Previous work gave more attention to evasion against text and graphbased detectors, but evasions against behavior-based detectors are largely ignored, leading to vulnerabilities in spam detection systems. Since real evasion data are scarce, we first propose EMERAL (Evasion via Maximum Entropy and Rating sAmpLing) to generate evasive spams to certain existing detectors. EMERAL can simulate spammers with different goals and levels of knowledge about the detectors, targeting at different stages of the life cycle of target products. We show that, in the evasiondefense dynamic, only a few evasion types are meaningful to the spammers, and any spammer will not be able to evade too many detection signals at the same time. We reveal that some evasions are quite insidious and can fail all detection signals. We then propose DETER (Defense via Evasion generaTion using EmeRal), based on model re-training on diverse evasive samples generated by EMERAL. Experiments confirm that DETER is more accurate in detecting both suspicious time window and individual spamming reviews. In terms of security, DETER is versatile enough to be vaccinated against diverse and unexpected evasions, is agnostic about evasion strategy and can be released without privacy concern.
I. INTRODUCTION
Many customers post reviews on online commerce websites such as Amazon and Yelp. the opinionated reviews help shape product ranking and reputation, find consumers high-quality products, and make products become more visible via wordof-mouth [10] , [9] , [8] . However, such a mechanism has also attracted many dishonest businesses to hire professional spammers to post ungrounded reviews to manipulate product reputations [22] , [42] , [2] , [49] . Customers can be misled to low quality products, honest businesses can suffer from unfair competition, and the whole online e-commerce can be rendered less trustworthy.
To combat opinion spams, prior works have proposed abundant different detection models based on texts [31] , [21] , [22] , [52] , user-behaviors [31] , [51] , [11] , network structures [1] , [48] , [27] . However, more resourceful spammers can exploit information about the detectors available through publications, spam-spotting guidance and detection websites 1 , to craft insidious spamming campaigns that can evade graphbased and text-based detectors [7] , [16] . However, adversarial evasions against behavior-based detectors have so far received less attention. This leads to potential vulnerabilities in spam detection systems that integrate behavior-based detectors.
Addressing this gap is non-trival, however. First, a deployed detectors can be subject to adversarial probing and attack. 1 https://www.fakespot.com/, and https://reviewmeta.com/ For example, a spammer can gather knowledge about training data, features and models of the detector and engineer evasive attacks against the probed detector [35] , [56] . Also, diverse spamming strategies are likely to be adopted simultaneously by multiple spammers. These scenarios lead to attack-defense strategy asymmetry -the defending strategy is not optimal with respect to the actual attacking strategy, and a detector assuming a fixed evasion strategy [43] , [4] , [32] is more vulnerable. Ideally, a detector has to be agnostic of any spamming strategies, but the simple solution of blindly reacting to anomalies of any detection signals can produce too many false positives (see the experiments).
Model retraining can obtain unseen but probable attacks to hardened the detector against future attacks without assuming a single fixed attacking strategy. The key is to generate spamming actions to quantitatively manipulate detection signals under certain domain constraints. In the spam detection application, existing evasion attacks adopt closed-form or differentiable objective functions [32] , [3] , [36] , [16] , [7] . In malware detection, regardless of the target detector, direct manipulation and feature-sampling mapping were adopted, with domain constraints preserved [53] , [43] , [33] or totally ignored [41] . evasions against classification models [3] , [23] are usually Generated in the feature space without constraints from the application domains. Crafting real spamming attacks under constraints is not pertaining to the high-level detection models and is thus more fundamental and challenging. For example, an attack can post all 5-star reviews to boost the overall rating of a product from 2 to 4 stars, but the attack will have a detectable skew rating distribution, due to the constraint over changes in average rating and attack rating distribution. While genetic algorithms [53] , [43] can hypothetically modify previous spamming campaigns for evasion, the approach is not scalable and requires a known spamming attack which is usually not available.
To address the challenges, we first identify, as the target of the spammer, a set of detection signals [55] , [34] , [35] , [38] , [51] , [11] that characterize spammer behaviors. We propose "EMERAL", a maximum entropy model to quantitatively encode the spammers' knowledge, objective and domain constraints. By solving the resulting optimization problem we obtain an optimal attacking vector that further guide the generation of real evasive spams. The model, captures explicitly capture the quantitative dependencies among multiple detection signals for realistic attack generation. The model is general, as multiple types of evasions against behavior-based detection signals can be included as objectives or constraints during different stage of the life-cycle of a product.
With EMERAL, we propose a novel defense, DETER, based on retraining, where training data containing possible future evasive spams are first generated by EMERAL and then used to train more effective detector without assuming a fixed evasion strategy. Based on the weights learned by DETER and the properties of evasion generation, DETER can be released to the spammer without security concern. Experimentally, the new defense is shown to be superior to any fixed single detection signals, simple signal aggregation and even ensembles of multiple classifiers trained on the same adversarial examples.
II. DETECTION AND THREAT MODELS
A review system has a set of accounts U = {u 1 , . . . , u n }, items V = {v 1 , . . . , v m }, and reviews R = {r ij : i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, j ∈ {1, . . . , m}}, where r ij is the review posted by account u i to item v j . r ij contains its text contents c(r ij ), its rating s(r ij ) and its posting time t(r ij ). We focus on detection model based on aggregated rating behaviors over time [12] , [51] , [11] , [24] , [55] : reviews in R are grouped into windows and for each window, numeric detection signals in Table I are computed to obtain window suspicious scores. These window-wise signals are unique and not available in detection on the review, reviewer and item level, and can help detect individual reviews [12] . We focus on spammers, be it human or bots, with the goal of promoting the target products' long and short term reputation, measured in cmulative average rating (CAR) and current month ranking (CMR, defined as the ranking of a business, among all businesses, based on the current month's average rating [44] ). CAR and CMR are shown to be vulnerable to spammers' manipulations [26] , [45] , [13] . The demoting spams can be handled similarly by the proposed models. We first introduce behavior-based detection signals defined by previous work.
A. Time series based detection signals
Normal review traffic shall arrive in a smooth manner while spamming reviews usually arrive in a more abrupt pattern [51] , [11] . Besides, to effectively promote product reputation, spammers also aim at lifting the average rating of the targets significantly [10] , [9] , [8] . Time series-based detection constructs and monitors time series to spot such changes in review volume and rating. A time series is a sequence of temporally ordered random variables x = [X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X t , . . . ], and x n m = [X m , . . . , X n ] denotes the portion from time window m to n. For the t-th window (we also refer t to the window or the timespan of the window), the signals NR (number of reviews) and CAR (cumulative average rating) can be calculated to obtain two time series:
where N t is the number of reviews ever posted up to window t. These two series can capture the large volume of spamming reviews and inflated average ratings. Changes in NR and CAR, denoted by ∆NR and ∆CAR, can capture the abrupt changes in the volume of reviews and accumulated average rating:
The deviation of the actual time series value from the value predicted by a model that assumes smoothness of the series, such as auto-regressive models, can capture unexpected changes in the time series. In particular, an order d autoregressive model (AR(d)) predicts X t using historic data x t−1 t−d and a linear model θ
The deviation of the predicted CAR ( CAR(t)) from the actual CAR, can be used for detection (only promotion is considered):
CAR-DEV(t) = max{ CAR(t) − CAR(t), 0}.
The larger the CAR-DEV, the more suspicious the window.
B. Distribution-based detection signals
A spammer needs to post a large number of positive fake reviews to promote the target. Thus if the percentage of positive reviews within a window is abnormally high, there are likely spamming activities. The signal PR (Positive Ratio) [38] , [35] is calculated based on this intuition:
where n t is the number of reviews within window t. Second, the overall rating distributions of the t-th window p(t) = [p 1 (t), . . . , p 5 (t)], with p i (t) be estimated by |r : s(r) = i and t(r) ∈ t|/n t , can be perturbed by spamming ratings and deviate from the background rating distribution. Such distortion in rating distribution can be used as for spam detection [12] , [34] , [38] . Let p = [p 1 , . . . , p 5 ] be the rating distribution of all historic ratings up to time t: p i = |r : s(r) = i and t(r) ≤ t|/N t . The KL divergence between these two distributions detects distortion in rating distribution:
The larger the KL-DIV, the farther p(t) is away from p, and thus the more suspicious the t-th window. Third, define the rating entropy
If the rating entropy of a window is low, then the ratings therein are highly concentrating on a certain value while a normal distribution shall have a certain level of dispersion across multiple values [38] (such as a U-shape [17] ). A related signal is the change in rating entropy ∆EN = EN(t) − EN(t − 1). The window t is suspicious if ∆EN< 0.
III. EMERAL: AN EVASION GENERATOR
After discussing the threat model, we present EMERAL (Evasion via Maximum Entropy and Rating sAmpLing) to generate evasions against behavior-based detection signals. The resulting optimization problem allows effective and efficient evasion generation (Section III-D).
A. Threat model
A threat model captures what knowledge about the defense system an adversary can learn about and exploit to evade the defense system [7] , [43] , [46] , [41] . Abundant review data, including account and item profiles, review ratings and timestamps, are publicly available on review websites to all users, including spammers. For new or less popular products, less historic data is available and yet they have a higher incentive to spam. An evasion should be able to generate attacks even with scarce data. Obtaining labeled data is easy through multiple channels: 1) released review data are filtered before being made public and thus represent normal reviews; 2) Yelp further releases identified spams; 3) spam spotting services, such as Fakespot and ReviewMeta, release predicted class labels or probability too. Behavior-based detection signals are published with great details [35] . 
B. Evading behavior-based signals
In a spamming campaign, a spammer needs to know the exact ratings of each of spams to manipulate target rating while evading signals based on rating distribution, such as KL-DIV, EN, ∆EN and PR. We propose to first find an evading rating distribution and then sample ratings from the distribution for the spams.
To evade KL-DIV, all ratings, including spamming and normal ones, in the current time window should have a rating distribution p close top that the defender considers normal. Specifically, let R ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 5} be a random variable of ratings such that p(R = r) = p r ≥ 0 and 5 r=1 p r = 1. For a target with many ratings, the spammer can estimatep i from the ratings using MLE. For the t-th window, the spammer can find p with minimal KL-divergence top
The spammer wants to move CAR tox t from x t , where x t is the CAR at time t without spams. When targeting at promotional spamming, the spammer needs the manipulated CAR to be close to but not to exceed the targetx t . Let N t−1 be the number of ratings accumulated up to time t, n t be the number of existing ratings at time t without the spamming ratings, and n δ be the number of spamming ratings to be added. E p (R) = 5 r=1 r × p r is the expectation of R. Then the manipulated CAR after the attack is (N t−1 x t−1 + (n t + n δ )E p [R])/(N t + n t + n δ ) and the goal becomes:
where ǫ > 0 is a small positive number to allow slack inx t . In addition, the spammer can evade ∆EN and NPR by adding relevant constraints, leading to the following inequality-constrained KL-divergence minimization problem:
The first two constraints are derived from Eq. (3), and the third enforces the rating distribution entropy H(p) to be at least H t−1 + H δ to evade ∆EN (change in entropy). The constraint p 4 + p 5 < P ensures that after spamming, the ratio of positive reviews (4 and 5 star ratings) will not exceed P to evade PR (ratio of positives). The optimization can be solved using Lagrangian multiplier method:
We can use gradient ascent to find the optimal Lagrangian multipliers α * , β * , γ * and λ * . Evading EN is similar and can be done by setting the target distributionp to the uniform distribution.
The above optimization problem assumes that the number of spamming reviews (n δ ) and the target CAR value (x t ) are given. We further set these parameters to evade ∆CAR (change in Cumulative Average Rating), CAR-DEV (Cumulative Average Rating deviation) and ∆NR (change in the number of reviews) that focus on abrupt changes in time series. By assuming that the defender adopts a degree d AR model θ to capture CAR deviation, the spammer sets δ t =x t − x t so that 1)x t is as high as possible; 2) |x t −x t | < ǫ to evade the detection of CAR-DEV; where ǫ is a small number and x t is the predicted CAR by the AR model. 3)x t+1 (δ t ) is maximized to allow a larger δ t+1 to be added to x t+1 while |x t+1 (δ t ) + δ t+1 −x t+1 | < ǫ.
Note thatx t+1 is a function of δ t since the next AR model θ (t+1) is updated onx t . Overall the spammer can
where U is an upper bound of the time series (U = 5 for CAR). Assuming the spammer mimics the defender by training θ using online gradient descent with learning rate η, then Eq. (7) becomes the following constrained quadratic programming problem:
The optimal δ is denoted by δ * t and is used to set x t = x t + δ * t in Eq. (3). The spammer also wants to evade detection based on burst detection [51] , [11] . We can add the constraint |x t−1 − (x t + δ)| < ǫ, to reduce ∆CAR. To reduce ∆NR, a spammer samples n δ ratings from the distribution obtained from Eq. (4), such that n δ is below the p-percentile of all positive historical increments in NR. To optimize δ, the spammer needs to know both the degree of AR model and the CDF (cumulative distribution function) of the detection signals on the defender side. We empirically show that lacking knowledge of d and p will not prevent spammers from conducting effective and evasive attacks.
The overall evasion procedure EMERAL is described in Algorithm 1. EMERAL requires the target to have a reasonably long history of reviews to calculate the evasion parameters. Note that the algorithm may fail to find an evasive spamming plan for a window, and in that case, the spammer will not attempt to attack. Based on preliminary experiment, there are only 9 combinations of detection singals, denoted by E1 to
Algorithm 1 EMERAL
Input: Reviews of a target; maximum number of trials M . Output: Ratings of spamming reviews to be posted. Select n δ and δ * t based on historic reviews. Set rating distribution: p5 = 1 and pi = 0, i = 1, . . . , 4. if Evade rating distribution-based signals then
Use n δ and δ * t to solve problem (4) to find p(t)
E9
2 , that are profitable for the spammers to evade.
C. EMERAL for early spamming: evasion E-A and E-B
It is shown that dishonest businesses have a strong motivation to conduct promotional spamming early on when their products are open for review [24] , [38] . We adapt EMERAL to generate evasive spams for such situations. A new product will have a smaller number of reviews for a spammer to probe evasion parameters from the CDFs of the signals. However, a spammer can leverage the CDFs of the signals based on the early reviews of other products and estimate the evasion parameters. In particular, a spammer can obtain NR, ∆NR, ∆CAR and rating distribution of the early time windows of all available products, and then tries maximize the entropy while safisfying constraints over NR, ∆NR and ∆CAR (E-A). Evasion E-B tries to post a maximum number of 5 star reviews to evade NR, ∆NR and ∆CAR at the same time.
D. Empirical properties of EMERAL on late spamming
We use datasets collected from Amazon and Yelp [15] , [38] .
To spam targets with long review histories, we filter products on Amazon with less than 1000 reviews or having less than 37 weeks of reviews, and restaurants on Yelp having less than 37 months of reviews (a month/week is referred to as a "time window" on the two datasets, respectively). The results are 383 products with 1175088 reviews on Amazon, and 327 restaurants with 247117 reviews on Yelp. The evasions are created on each target for the last 5 consecutive time windows based on knowledge obtained from all previous time windows (32 in total). We compute evasions with strategies E1 to E9, assuming that the spammer aims to keep each detection signal lower than the 80 percentiles of the corresponding signals' CDFs after the attacks. The average numbers of total/negative/positive spams posted in all test windows by each evasion on the two datasets are shown in Figure 1a and 1f. One can observe that all evasions post much more positive spams than negatives to promote business ratings and rankings. Interestingly, if a spammer decides to evade rating distribution related signals, as with evasions E5 to E9, some negative reviews have to be posted, while with evasions E1 to E4, there is no negative reviews. Since EMERAL does not guarantee that an evasive rating distribution can be found, Figures 1b and 1g show the percentages of windows that an evasion is possible. Evasions 1-4 are successful in most of the windows (more than 70%) while Evasions 5-9 are more conservative due to constraints over rating distribution. Figures 1c and 1d on the top row show the promotions in the target's CMR and CAR per spamming review, averaged over all targets and test windows, on the Amazon dataset. We can see that evasions 5-9 are less profitable to the spammers as the promotions are rather small, and evasions 1-4 can promote the target rather effectively. We tried to evade other combinations of the signals using EMERAL but found out that it is hard to find evasions valuable to the spammers. As a result, the defender needs not to consider evasions against other combination of signals in Table I .
E. Empirical properties of EMERAL on early spamming
The early windows of the datasets that are not used for late spamming are used for early evasions. In the same set of figures for late spamming, we use the last two bars in each subfigure to demonstrate the properties of early evasive spamming. In Figures 1a and 1f , we can see that average numbers of total/negative/positive spams post in each early windows. There is not large difference in the total number, but E-A creates a small amount of negative reviews due to entropy maximization. In Figures 1b and 1g , we can see that E-B has a successful rate two times of the rate of E-A, leading to higher per spam utility in CMR and CAR promotions, shown in Figures 1c, 1h, 1d and 1i. We conclude that early spamming is very attractive to spammers and advanced defense against early spamming need to be deployed, as we will do next. Spammer knowledge requirements From Section III-B, for evasive late spamming, it seems that the spammer needs to know the degree the AR model and the p-percentile of the CDF of historic CAR to find out ǫ for solving Eq. (8). For evasion E4, which requires d and p, the two parameters can be selected from wide ranges so that they can be different from the values used by the defender. Figures 1e and 1j show the ranking promotion brought by E4 after detection based on the spammers' assumptions is not much affected by the inaccurate knowledge of these two hyper-parameters. For example, different d values achieve similar spamming utility as when d is the same as the value set by the defender. There is no parameter d in early spamming.
IV. DETER: EVASION AGNOSTIC DEFENSES
The defender may assume a fixed evasion strategy that is optimal for the spammer and then devise a detection model accordingly. For example, based on the above analysis, the defender can assume that a rational spammer will only use Evasion 4 to spam late review windows. In reality, multiple spammers can choose different evasion strategies and a spammer can change its strategy as well. We propose such a defense called DETER (Defense via Evasion generaTion using EmeRal) that works well regardless of which evasion strategy is adopted by the spammers.
DETER is based on defense model re-training [43] , [29] , [23] , [20] . However, the re-training relies on a evasion generator, which is not available without EMERAL. For a target with long review history (with more than 30 windows), earlier windows (the first 30 windows) are used to train an EMERAL model, which generates 9 types of evasions on later windows (after the 30-th windows, group 1) of the targets. For early spamming, all targets are partitioned into two subsets. We pool all early windows (the first 30 ones) of the targets in the first subset together to train a single EMERAL model, which generates two types of early evasions (Section III-C) on all early windows of the targets in the second subset. Detection signals are computed for each window where evasion are attempted. Labels are assigned accordingly ("spammed" (or "not spammed") if EMERAL finds an evasion (or fails to generate any spam)). For the two groups of windows with attempted evasion, respectively, the defender pools the labeled windows from all targets for all evasion types within the group to train a logistic regression model (using sklearn with the default hyper-parameters) to detect windows spammed with unknown evasion strategy during late or early review periods.
A. Effectiveness of DETER for late spam detection
Suspicious window detection AUC is used as the defender's metric 3 . As two baselines, the defender can train a classifier using data obtained from each evasion type, and during testing, detect spammed windows by pooling all classifier outputs using the MAX or AVG function (denoted by EN M and EN A, short for ENsemble Max and ENsemble Average, respectively). DETER, EN M and EN A are all based on retraining and agnositic about evasion strategies, as opposed to w i , i = 1, . . . , 9, w a , w m and w r , which are only best for a single evasion strategy.
Two randomized evasion strategies are created to confirm that DETER works without knowing the evasion strategy. The first one ("Rand1") assumes that each window is spammed with one of the 9 pure strategies with equal probability, and the second ("Rand2") assumes that half of the windows are spammed with Evasion 4, while the remaining windows are spammed with the other strategies with equal probability. Overall, there are 11 evasion strategies (9 pure: E1 to E9, plus 2 mixed: Rand1 and Rand2) and 15 defense strategies (9 pure: w i , i = 1, . . . , 9, plus w m , w a , w r , EN M, EN A and DETER), resulting in 11×15 strategy profiles. Rand1, Rand2, E5 -E9 are randomized algorithms and we repeat each evasion and detection for 10 times, and the means of the AUCs under each strategy profile are reported in Table II . Standard deviation of AUC greater than 5e − 3 are reported as the subscripts of the means. Evasion strategies E1 -E4 are deterministic and only one experiment is needed. Due to space limit, we show the best AUC of {w i , i = 1, . . . , 9} (Best P).
From the table, we have the following observations. First, under strategies Rand1 and Rand2, DETER has the highest AUC than all the remaining defenses. Among the agnostic defenses, by averaging, EN A is the runner-up beating EN M, indicating that taking the maximum of the output is a reasonable defense but can be over-sensitive. Second, Best P is always better than w m , w a and w r , and we conclude that if the defender knows the exact evasion strategy, it can pick a single detection signal, rather than guessing using w r , which is inferior to DETER. Third, under E3, E4, E7 and E9 on the Amazon dataset, and E5 to E9 on the Yelp dataset, Best P outperforms all agnostic strategies (indicated by bold fonts with asterisks). However, such performances are based on the unrealistic assumption that all windows are spammed with the specific evasion strategies, and cannot be achieved in reality. According to Figure 1 , E5 to E9 are not effective in promoting target reputations (unprofitable for spammers) and a spammer is less likely to select them, although DETER outperforms or is comparable to Best P. The take-away is that, by evasive spamm generation, data pooling and detection model retraining, a defender can achieve stateof-the-art detection performance.
One may question the security of DETER: what if a spammer reads this paper and then implements and evades DETER? Figure 2 shows the weights learned by DETER over the 9 detection signals on two datasets. We can see that With other few medium weights watching rating distribution entropy, it would be quite difficult for a spammer to evade this set of detection signals, while evading a larger set of signals will significantly reduce reputation promotion (see Section ?? especially Figure ?? ). The strategy profile consisting of the trained DETER model and any evasion strategies is a Nash equilibrium when the defender aims at detection AUC and spammers aim at promotion.
B. Effectiveness of DETER for early spam detection
For early spamming, the spammer can choose from two evasion strategies, E-A and E-B. As shown in Figures IIb and IId, when dealing with evasion type E-A, the 3 adaptive detectors based on EMERAL and re-training (EN M, EN A and DETER) have comparable or even better performance than the best pure detection strategy (Best P). When dealing with E-B, these three detectors significantly outperform Best P. In sum, EMERAL provides sufficient knowledge about a wide spectrum of spams to vaccinate the defender in the face of whatever evasion strategy.
C. Effectiveness of DETER for spamming review detection
We adopt the state-of-the-art spam detector, SpEagle [38] , which combine the features of the reviews, reviewers and products with the reviewer-product graph. We show that the window suspicious scores generated by those window detectors based on re-training can help SpEagle identify individual spamming reviews. We run evasion E4 for late spamming and evasion E-B for early spamming on YelpChi and YelpNYC datasets [38] , respectively, generating spams to be detected by SpEagle. The above evasions provide the rating distributions of the spams in test windows, and the actual spams are posted by a random subset of the existing accounts at some randomly picked time during the test window. To rank reviews based on their suspicious scores, we multiply the review posteriors produced by SpEagle by the suspicious score of the window where the review sits in. The detection AUC are shown in Figure 3 . It is clear that those window detectors based on re-training using EMERAL (EN M, EN A and DETER) outperform the remaining ones. In particular, DETER outperforms EN M and EN A in the late spamming cases and is comparable to EN A in the early spamming cases.
V. RELATED WORK
Opinion spams are different from social spams [18] , [14] , [28] , [54] , web spams [50] , email spams [39] in terms of spamming goal and detection mechanism, and we focus on opinion spams. Graph-based approaches leverage the relationships between reviewer accounts, reviews and products to detect spams, suspicious accounts and dishonest businesses [47] , [30] , [38] , even with evasive camouflages [16] Text-based approaches identify spamming reviews based on the contents of the reviews, using linguistic features and psychological features [37] , topic model [40] , semantic analysis [25] , etc. Behavior-based approaches [51] , [11] , [55] , [24] , [31] , [21] look for abnormal patterns in the the volume and distribution of user ratings, which are complementary to graphs and texts based approaches. To the best of our knowledge, no previous work has considered generative models for evading and securing behavior-based opinion spam detection.
Randomized defenses help to obfuscate the details of the defender and prevent attackers from taking advantage of any static defense strategies [5] , [46] . DETER does not need randomization for privacy purpose, since it prevents the spammers from creating campaigns that are both evasive and effective. If privacy is indeed a concern when using DETER, randomization can be implemented via differential privacy [6] . Randomized evasion is handled by DETER, demonstrated by two randomized evasion strategies.
Generating adversarial examples is critical to secure and robust machine learning models: if the models can see (foresee) most/all of the adversarial examples during training [29] , [43] , then during test time, most adversarial examples crafted by the attackers can be correctly detected. Adversarial example can be generated in either feature spaces [32] , [19] , [46] or problem spaces [46] , [53] , [41] . Generation in the feature space usually admits a convex and differentiable optimization problem whose solutions can be efficiently found as adversarial examples. However, the generated vectors usually cannot be mapped to realistic examples in the problem space and often tend to be over-pessimistic. Example generation in problem spaces requires domain knowledge and usually involves nonconvex and non-differentiable optimization problems. The work here is the first step towards rigorous, efficient and realistic adversarial spam generation in the problem space.
Game theory has been used in secure machine learning [5] , [32] , [4] . They assume that the attacker and defender know each other's objective function and try to use game theory to arrive at a Nash equilibrium so that both parties do not seek other solutions. We use the concept of game theory to analyze the behaviors of a rational and well-informed spammer, instead of using game theory to find a secure defense solution. In fact, a Nash equilibrium may be too strong an assumption in the context of spam detection, as multiple spammers can adopt different strategies or a spammer may have no knowledge about the defender's strategy.
VI. CONCLUSION
We proposed a flexible and general computational evasion model ("EMERAL") against state-of-the-art spam detection techniques for both early and late stage review periods of the targets. The spamming campaigns generated are effective in reputation manipulation and detection evasions, and require only public available datasets and published detection methods without knowing the exact hyper-parameter values. EMERAL does not require differentiable models or heuristic search. We showed that a spammer can only evade a handful of signals but has a dominating evasion strategy representing the worst case for the defender. We considered more realistic scenarios with mixtures of evasion strategies, and devised DETER, an evasion-agnostic defenses based on model retraining. Experiments showed that data pooling is the best defense, among other ensemble methods.
